Abbas Looks To The PLO To Weaken Hamas

2006-03-03

Commentary by Anna Mahjar-Barducci

The [Beirut] Daily Star

www.dailystar.com.lb/ article.asp?edition_id=10 &categ_id=5&article_id=22635#

In his speech at the opening session of the newly elected Palestinian Parliament, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas declared: "We are all required to continue activating and strengthening the Palestinian Liberation Organization's role as the sole legitimate representative of our people."

With these words, Abbas laid out a new strategy: the PLO would be the key to destabilizing Hamas' rule and would help restore Fatah's leadership. It is remarkable that Abbas gave such a speech. After the Oslo Accords, the Fatah leadership in Ramallah sought to weaken the PLO - a Fatah-dominated umbrella group, but that also includes most major Palestinian factions. This strategy was adopted because, at the time, the PLO represented the old guard - those who had decided to remain in Tunis, thereby signaling their opposition to Oslo and their refusal to recognize the PA as representative of the Palestinian people.

It was the secretary general of Fatah, Farouq Qaddoumi, along with those who remained with him in Tunis as well as the Syrian regime, who promoted the strategy of strengthening the PLO in order to oppose Yasser Arafat's policies. Oslo generated deep internal divisions within Fatah between those who supported the accords - among them Abbas - and those opposed, led by Qaddoumi. In fact, it was more a power struggle than an ideological one, since Arafat himself had stated that Oslo was merely a temporary truce. But Qaddoumi feared that Arafat would transform Fatah from a liberation movement into a political party.

Consequently, Arafat sought to impede Qaddoumi's efforts to become indisputable leader of the PLO. In the course of this struggle, Arafat marginalized his rivals within Fatah and strengthened his own powers and those of the PA.

Abbas' approach, at least until the recent parliamentary elections, was similar to that of Arafat: to weaken the PLO. Abbas rejected Qaddoumi's recommendation to strengthen the PLO, since he wanted to strengthen only the PA - to reinforce his own status as president, but also to delegate more powers to his ministers. Indeed, it was in order to strengthen the PA that Abbas insisted on holding parliamentary elections on schedule.

Hamas' victory changed the picture. Abbas found himself in a dilemma. To continue strengthening the PA would mean giving more power to the Hamas-led government and Parliament. But to leave the PA under Hamas control and allow the movement to lead the Palestinian cause would bring about Fatah's demise. So far, Abbas has rejected Fatah's joining a coalition with Hamas so long as the latter refuses to accept his conditions: recognition of Israel, recognition of all prior agreements between Israel and the PA, and an end to violence. These were the same conditions the PLO and Fatah were obliged to accept almost two decades ago in order to receive international recognition, even though there is still some disagreement over them within Fatah itself.

Hamas has, for the moment, adopted a policy of pragmatism. It has agreed to maintain contacts with Israel in order to address the daily needs of Palestinians, while keeping alive the option of a resort to armed resistance. As long as Hamas upholds this strategy, Abbas will not cooperate with the movement. That is why he has decided, instead, to try and destabilize Hamas' rule by strengthening the PLO as the higher Palestinian political body. The problem will be to convince Palestinians to once again believe in the PLO.

Abbas has already transferred control over some security agencies to the PLO and has stressed that negotiations with Israel can be held only through the PLO. He has made it clear to Hamas' parliamentarians that it was only thanks to Oslo and the PLO that they were able to participate in the recent elections. After bringing Oslo and the PLO back to life, Abbas is now looking for partners to implement his new strategy.

The danger is that in weakening the PA in favor of the PLO, Abbas may also weaken his own position as president. To avoid this, Abbas has asked for Qaddoumi's help (Qaddoumi is one of the venerable symbols of the PLO), while he also hopes to swiftly marginalize him. Abbas recently dispatched a delegation to Tunis, and Qaddoumi met with Palestinian factions in Damascus to discuss how to reinvigorate the PLO.

In his speech at the inauguration ceremony of the new Parliament, Abbas also mentioned reactivating the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the parliament in exile of the Palestinians which is also part of the PLO, in order to further diminish the impact of the legislative elections. Indeed, in the next few weeks a meeting of the PNC may be called in Cairo.

Within this framework, the role of the young Fatah leaders from the PA-controlled territories, such as Muhammad Dahlan, will be reduced. One of the reasons for this is Dahlan's "arrogant" attitude, say Fatah members in Tunis. Eventually, however, the young leaders may become useful allies of Abbas at the next Fatah conference, to be held in March, in which the organization will formulate its political strategy and decide whether to transform itself into a party or to remain a liberation organization, as Fatah's armed factions and the PLO in the diaspora want it to be.

Anna Mahjar-Barducci is a Tunis-based Moroccan-Italian journalist. She was correspondent in the Occupied Territories during the second Intifada. Her commentaries are regularly published in the Italian daily Il Foglio. She wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.

Source: IMRA – Independent Media Review and Analysis