From the Israel Archives |
Coverage of the Events since October 2000
Hände weg von Israel und Islam!
JCSS's Post-Pullout Scenerios Bleak
2005-08-13
The Jerusalem Post
www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite? pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull& cid=1123901309942&p=1101615860782
A leading Israeli think tank predicts that the disengagement is highly likely to lead to an eruption of Arab terrorism in the West Bank and to exasperate political, economic and social chaos among the Palestinians.
According to researchers at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies affiliated with Tel Aviv University, the Palestinian terrorists' major focus in the post-disengagement scenario will be to attack Jewish settlements and access roads in Judea and Samaria.
"Gaza will at least serve as a training area and as the terrorists' rear echelon and support base for weapons smuggling and local production; and will offer safe harbor for wanted terrorists and senior commanders," their strategic assessment said.
The report was drafted by Mark Heller, an expert on the Palestinians, and Shalom Harari, a former advisor on Palestinian affairs in the Ministry of Defense. They also predicted that the current Palestinian leadership would ultimately "fail the test" of running their Israeli-free Gaza Strip effectively and responsibly. Immediate indications of this will be manifested by an uncontrolled land grab of formerly Jewish property (18 percent of the Gaza Strip) by squatters and other interested parties, despite the establishment of a special 5,000-man force under the command of Interior Minister Nasir Yousef, the paper said.
They predicted the disengagement may also provide Hamas with a favorable environment in which to build a larger militia, since the organization will enjoy a considerable degree of immunity, at least at first, as a result of international pressure on Israel to allow the PA time to organize itself and stabilize the situation in the area.
Entitled, The Effects of Disengagement on Palestinian Politics and Society, the report is eerily similar in assessments being made by senior members in IDF intelligence. The paper said that the sight of unilateral Israeli withdrawal "will almost certainly provide some short-term psychological gratification." But this would hardly provide for a fundamental change in underlying conditions or a resolution of the current dilemmas, some of which may actually be exacerbated.
The disengagement will also deliver a tough economic blow to the Gazans since some 5,000 are expected to lose their jobs in Gush Katif, not to mention the end to the gray employment from the West Bank once the security fence is completed sometime in 2006.
Heller and Harari also predicted that without public order and transparency, the $3 billion in announced global aid for reconstructing Gaza risks disappearing like the billions in aid given to the Palestinian Authority before 2000.
The bottom line in the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies paper is that the disadvantages and risks and opportunities of the disengagement outweigh the benefits under the current circumstances. However, the researchers suggested a number of steps Israel could take to ameliorate the predicted negative consequences of the disengagement and boost PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.
These include accelerating "safe passage" between Gaza and the West Bank, a massive release of Palestinian prisoners, permitting the rehabilitation of the airport and seaport in Gaza, avoiding large-scale destruction of existing Israeli facilities and infrastructure and transferring them intact to the PA.
But the paper predicted that the Israeli government would likely be paralyzed after September by coalition crises and possible elections in an atmosphere of post-disengagement trauma.
"The two sides will be pursuing contradictory aims in any experiment in confidence-building," the paper said. "In advance of Israeli elections, the Israeli government will want to mark time and make minimal unrequited concessions; in advance of Palestinian elections, the PA will want to maximize concrete gains while minimizing any reciprocity in order to demonstrate the superiority of coordination with Israel over the preferred Hamas approach of outright confrontation."
