Heading For A Failed State [And What Of The Bush Model?]

2005-07-03

[IMRA: Consider the contrast:

Addressing fears of a repeat of the Vietnam "quagmire", President Bush assured the American people at the time they invaded Iraq that US forces would be out in relatively short order. Yet when it became apparent that a substantial American presence would be required for a considerable number of years before local Iraqi forces could be relied upon to do the job he did not hesitate and told the public - bucking the polls, media, etc. - that the American withdrawal would have to be postponed.

Both Prime Minister Sharon's team and America's representative on the scene, Lt. Gen.Ward, say for the record that the Palestinians are not ready to take responsibility nor that it is clear when they will be. But instead of following Pres. Bush's lead Mr. Sharon's mantra remains: "disengagement on schedule regardless of the situation".]

Efraim Inbar

The Jerusalem Post

www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite? pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull& cid=1120357179299&p=1006953079865

Much of the international community is expecting that the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will facilitate the return of the Israeli and Palestinian parties to the negotiating table within the framework of the road map. Moreover, Chairman Mahmoud Abbas is seen as the leader capable of putting an end to Palestinian violence, reforming Palestinian society and making the necessary compromises to reach an agreement with Israel.

It is incredible to see foreign officials, diplomats and the media simply refusing to come to terms with the current harsh reality in the Palestinian Authority. They seem unprepared to digest the bad news that Abbas has failed to achieve his commendable mission. Moreover, the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will actually strengthen the divisive trends in Palestinian society, making it poorer, more violence-prone and less willing to reach a deal with Israel.

Unfortunately, Abbas cannot transcend Yasser Arafat's political legacy. Arafat's PA was a Byzantine, corrupt system in which he ruled by divide-and-conquer tactics, allowing competition between leaders and agencies, and even militias which left him the ultimate arbiter and dispenser of jobs and remuneration. This decentralized system eventually degenerated into chaos and lack of law and order (fawdah).

Abbas, a man with far less political standing than Arafat among the Palestinians, was elected in January 2005 to head the PA after promising to reform the security organs and enforce law and order. He preferred the incorporation of the armed men into the official security organs over confrontation with the armed gangs, achieving only partial success so far. He has failed miserably in centralizing the security services and in appointing new and loyal officers. Indeed, the fawdah is continuing unabated as the recent armed attacks on PA officials, civilians and other gangs clearly demonstrate.

Moreover, Abbas was capable of negotiating only a fragile truce (tahadiyeh) with some of the militias concerning Israel in March. While the level of Palestinian terrorism declined drastically - primarily because of Israeli counter-terror measures and Palestinian weariness of the conflict - the Palestinian militias, even those party to the tahadiyeh, have intensified their attempts to attack Israeli targets in recent months, thus challenging Abbas's rule.

THE CONTINUING economic crisis in the PA is further weakening Abbas's regime. The lack of law and order is inimical to a climate that encourages regular economic activity and growth. The chaos in the PA also hinders the efforts of the international community to deliver aid to the Palestinians.

The PA is further weakened by the ascendance of Hamas in Palestinian politics. Hamas has succeeded in filling the vacuum left by an inept PA by developing a system of services to the population and an image of an uncorrupt Hamas leadership dedicated to the needs of the people. Abbas's domestic failures are fertile ground for the growing appeal of the Islamists.

Hamas did extremely well in the recent municipal elections and Palestinian pollsters indicate that Hamas enjoys at least a third of popular support.

Hamas's growing role in Palestinian politics portends increasing difficulty regarding the dismantling of its armed wing, which will, in turn, make Abbas's quest for monopoly over use of force a more distant goal. Hamas's growing influence will also harden Palestinian positions on the conflict with Israel, making an agreement more difficult to reach. There is little reason to believe that empowerment of radical Islamists leads to moderation.

Finally, the impending Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in August poses a formidable test for Abbas and the Palestinian political system. The PA's ability to prevent the looting of the Israeli property left behind and its ensuring of a smooth takeover of the land evacuated by Israel is far from certain. Efforts to coordinate the withdrawal with the Palestinians are not encouraging and even elicited a visit by Condoleezza Rice to prod the Palestinians into working harder on the issue.

What we may well see is violent exchanges over the control of the newly available turf. Hamas is stronger in Gaza than in the West Bank and would like to take advantage of its power to further improve its stance vis-a-vis the PA. All Palestinian factions understand that the "facts" established during the "liberation of Gaza" will affect future intra-Palestinian political patterns. Even if Abbas reaches an agreement with the militias on the division of spoils, the basic structural problem of absence of monopoly over the use of force will remain unsolved. The PA's failure to gain control in Gaza will hinder any reform of the security services and further enhance Hamas's power in Gaza.

The first five months of Abbas's rule have been disappointing, and marked improvement any time soon is unlikely. Therefore the withdrawal from Gaza will probably accentuate the current trends in Palestinian society, making the PA a candidate for the title of "a failed state."

The writer is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.

Source: IMRA – Independent Media Review and Analysis