Brig.Gen. Eisencott: Only Effective Solution To Post-Disengagement Attacks Is Re-Occupation

2005-05-18

[IMRA: Unfortunately, the Sharon team has yet to actually think through the diplomatic/military scenario involved with a re-occupation. One reason for this may be that Prime Minister Sharon is adamant that Israel will retreat regardless of the morning-after consequences. It would come as no surprise that if Israel faces a diplomatic/military disaster after the retreat that many defense officials will then dig out various "back covering" memos that, buried in the text, predicted it.]

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Ze'ev Schiff

Haaretz

www.haaretz.com/hasen/ spages/577293.html

"In the present conflict against Palestinian terror, the IDF had excellent intelligence, like no other army has ever had in dealing with terror. I have found no other army with such quality of intelligence in a war of this type."

This statement came from Brigadier General Gadi Eisencott, commander of the Israel Defense Forces' Judea and Samaria division, who for the past two years directed most of the operations against terror organizations in the West Bank. He is one of the chief consumers of intelligence in Israel's war on terror, and consumers of intelligence are, as is well known, usually very critical. They tend to claim that they did not have enough information or it got to them too late, after the enemy had changed its position.

If Eisencott, who served in the past as military secretary to prime ministers Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon, is appointed the next head of the IDF Intelligence Branch, he will have to preserve the same high level of intelligence supplied to the forces in the field, and even improve it.

It is often mistakenly thought that most intelligence information comes from the Shin Bet security service, but in fact a great deal of it originates with military intelligence, through the eyes and ears of its battalions in the field.

Eisencott is among those who argue that advanced technology, including the air force, is not enough to win the war on terror. The enemy must know that it faces experienced fighters who also use pistols, and at short range. That is what causes terrorists to run and hide.

At the next stage of the fighting, after intelligence is obtained, must come control over the territory and the population. It is this control that ensures success. Eisencott was asked if in the case of the territories this success was not "too great," that is, did the army hit the Palestinians too hard, also bringing down the Palestinian Authority's security organizations so that no one was left to take over after Arafat's death?

Eisencott pointed out the surprising fact that in spite of the harshness of the blows, and with Palestinian security forces actually in collapse, the civilian system - education, health and most municipal systems - continued to function impressively.

And what will happen after the army withdraws and its control becomes very limited? In this case there will be no choice but to transfer control to the Palestinians, who will be assisted by third parties, such as American and British intelligence. And if the Palestinians can't manage to control terror?

Eisencott believes that many Palestinians today think that terror does them no good. That, apparently, is one reason that the activities of Hezbollah are limited in the territories. Israel must reinforce as much as possible the economic brakes on terrorism, especially by granting permits to work in Israel.

At present, the decision has been made not to strike the organizations supporting the cease-fire, which includes Hamas, except under extraordinary circumstances. On the other hand, the IDF continues to operate against Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front, which oppose the cease-fire. The inclination is also not to operate in areas that have been transferred to the PA unless it involves a "ticking bomb" and the other side is not honoring its obligations.

The most difficult component Eisencott foresees in case of an outbreak of violence is the firing of Qassam rockets and mortars from the West Bank on adjacent Israeli cities. The assumption is that Israel will have zero tolerance under such circumstances, and Eisencott believes there will be no choice but to reoccupy the area from which the rockets were fired.

Will renewed violence break out after disengagement? Perhaps. Opinions are divided about this in the IDF; it is clear to many that it depends to no small extent on Israel as well.

The army must be prepared for any eventuality. As long as there is no such outbreak, it must recommend steps that increase Palestinian motivation to rein in violence. If violence is renewed, the IDF must do everything to win tangibly at the lowest possible cost to the Israeli side.

Source: IMRA – Independent Media Review and Analysis