IMRA Newsletter
The End of the Turkish-Israeli Partnership?
Excerpt from: Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2004
http://www.meforum.org/article/657
Throughout the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy analysts had an easy job. After all, Turkish foreign policy was predictable. Ankara cooperated enthusiastically with Washington, whether in the Middle East or in the Balkans. Turkey aligned itself with Israel and kept at arms length from Middle Eastern neighbors such as Syria and Iran. In Europe, Ankara traded heavily with the European Union (EU) but did not allow the EU to dictate foreign policy. The European Union's frequent allegations and criticism of human rights abuses in Turkey, especially with regard to Turkey's fight against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan) terrorists, soured the relationship, which deteriorated even further when the EU declared Turkey unfit for membership at its December 1997 Luxembourg Summit.[1]
But today the situation is far different. On May 20, 2004, for example, Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused both Israel and the United States of "state terror."[2] The frequency and harshness of criticism of the Jewish state has increased greatly.[3] The shift within Turkey has been dramatic. Ankara's foreign policy is moving into alignment with that of the EU. Today, the Turkish foreign ministry endorses 95 percent of the EU's foreign policy decisions.[4] Not only did Turkey stay out of the war in Iraq, but it has maintained at best lukewarm support for U.S. initiatives on the Middle East ranging from the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) to holding the Iranian government accountable for its clandestine nuclear program.
These changes result from three seismic events in Turkey. First is the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The AKP is rooted in Turkey's Islamist opposition Welfare Party, which the Turkish supreme court shut down in 1997 for undermining the country's secular order. The AKP, which now calls itself a conservative democratic movement, came to power in a November 2002 landslide. Its electoral success had less to do with Islamist ideology, however, than with widespread public dissatisfaction with the economic and political instability and widespread corruption that characterized the 1990s.[5] The AKP received a solid mandate, taking two-thirds of the seats in the legislature, enough to pass constitutional amendments and dictate policies without respect to the secular opposition.
The second major change is a solid perception among the foreign policy elite in Ankara that after reforms to satisfy the EU's accession criteria, [6] Turkey now stands a chance of EU admission. Turkey's special relationship with the United States may have brought rewards, but none match the promise that Turks assume EU membership would bring.
The third shift in the Turkish-U.S. relationship has been the ripple effect of the 2003 Iraq war, which remains very unpopular in Turkey. According to a recent poll, when Turks were forced to opt between the EU and the United States, 51 percent chose the EU; only six percent favored the United States. Perhaps reflecting the anger over the Iraq war, the same poll showed that a third of all Turks identified the United States as the greatest threat to world piece.[7] Understanding the new dynamics is key to identifying the new parameters of Turkish foreign policy and to determining where Turkey-and its important relationship with the United States-might go.
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The End of the Turkish-Israeli Partnership?
But, the greatest divergence between Ankara and Washington revolves perhaps around Israel. Turkey and the European Union have adopted a common front arguing that reform and progress in the Middle East cannot happen until a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is found.[26] Given the Turkish government's influence on the media, it is not surprising that 72 percent of Turks now have a negative view of the Greater Middle East Initiative and that more than two-thirds believe Turkey should side with the Palestinians (less than 3 percent thought that Turkey should favor Israel).[27] Both Turkey and the EU criticize Israel's targeted killing of Hamas leaders.[28] Erdogan referred to the killing of Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin as a "terrorist act,"[29] and the daily Yeni Safak labeled Yassin's assassination "Israeli terrorism."[30]
Yeni Safak provides a window into AKP thinking. The newspaper's owner Sadik Albayrak and Erdogan are in-laws. The prime minister again accused Israel of "state terrorism" after an Israeli operation to root out weapons smuggling tunnels led to the demolition of several houses in Ramah.[31] Foreign Minister Abdullah G¸l added that the attacks could adversely affect Turkish-Israeli relations.[32] The Islamist daily Vakit went further and proclaimed that the "terrorist-Zionist state of Israel, a protÈgÈ of the United States and Britain," was conducting "genocide" in the Palestinian territories.[33] While the AKP cannot be held accountable for every statement in the Islamist press, the fact is that five years ago, such sentiments would not be found in the mass-circulation press.
With regard to Israel's security barrier, the Turkish government has been even more critical than the EU. When the U.N. General Assembly voted on a resolution condemning the fence on August 12, 2003, EU member countries abstained while Turkey joined a large number of Muslim countries in criticizing Israel.[34] AKP has also at times channeled aversion toward Israel into new calls for Islamist solidarity. Not by coincidence, the AKP increased its anti-Israel rhetoric just days ahead of the June 14 summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The Turkish candidate, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, later won election as the new OIC chair.
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Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
[1] "Luxembourg European Council 12 and 13 December 1997 Presidency Conclusions," European Commission, Luxembourg, Dec. 13 1997, at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/97/24&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
[2] H¸rriyet (Istanbul), May 20, 2004, at http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid~1@w~7@tarih~2004-05-20-m@nvid~415161,00.asp.
[3] Ibid., Mar. 22, 2004, at http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid~1@w~3@tarih~2004-03-22-m@nvid~387363,00.asp; idem, May 20, 2004, at http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid~1@w~7@tarih~2004-05-20-m@nvid~415161,00.asp.
[4] Author interview with a former Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Ankara, Aug. 2004.
[5] "Special Policy Forum Report, Turkey Goes to the Polls: A Post-Mortem," Policywatch, no. 675, Nov. 7, 2002, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch2002/675.htm.
[6] Soner Cagaptay, "European Union Reforms Diminish the Role of the Turkish Military: Ankara Knocking on Brussels' Door," Policywatch, no. 781, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Aug. 12, 2003, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/index.htm.
[7] Yusuf Ziya ÷zcan and Ihsan Dagi, "NATO ve T¸rk Dis Politikasi Arastirmasi," Pollmark Arastirma (Ankara), July 2004, p. 35.
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[26] "News from the Washington File," Federal Information and News Dispatch, Inc., U.S. State Department, Mar. 1, 2004; Egemen Bagis, "NATO, Iraq, and the Greater Middle East: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Relationship," Policywatch, no. 871, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 10, 2004, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/index.htm.
[27] ÷zcan and Dagi, "NATO ve T¸rk Dis Politikasi Arastirmasi," p. 50.
[28] H¸rriyet, Mar. 25, 2004; Onasa News Agency, Apr. 18, 2004.
[29] H¸rriyet, Mar. 25, 2004.
[30] Yeni Safak, Mar. 23, 2004.
[31] H¸rriyet, May 20, 2004.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Vakit, May 21, 2004.
[34] Press Release, GA/10216, United Nations, Aug. 12, 2003, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/ga10216.doc.htm.
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