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Der Krieg ist der Vater der Dinge. -HERAKLIT
http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/comment.cfm?id=648
2001-08-03
When analyzing the question of targeted attacks against terrorists as a counter-terrorism measure, there are two aspects that need to be addressed: the matter of the moral and legal implications and the question of the effectiveness of such a strategy. With regard to the moral question, it can be argued that since the Palestinians imposed a war of attrition on Israel in October 2000, Israel is morally allowed, in the face of a terrorist and guerilla war, to use violence in self-defense directly against terrorists engaged in executing these attacks.
However, one must differentiate between attacks against actual terrorists, who are directly involved in executing attacks on civilians, and members of the political wing of a terrorist organization. While the leaders and activists of the organization's political wing are not legitimate targets of attack, it is legal by any standard of international legislation to use violence against enemy military personnel, especially in time of war. Moreover, compared to most other counter-terrorist offensive measures, targeted attacks on individual terrorists are more selective, and less likely to result in collateral damage, and thus more humane.
This brings us to the question of whether targeted attacks can be viewed as an effective means of combating terrorism. This question can only be answered by means of a cost-benefit analysis. On the benefit side, we can place two factors: as long as the targets of these attacks are terrorists of an organization's military wing, who are personally engaged in either the preparation or the execution of severe terrorist attacks, neutralizing these people may greatly influence the capability of the terrorist organization to execute the attacks. In any event, the operation will disrupt terrorist attacks that are in the final stages of preparation by the people targeted. At the same time, hitting the terrorists may also influence the organization's long-term capability to carry out attacks. The second factor on the benefit side of the equation is that members of the organization's military wing will need to spend time and resources in guarding themselves; in the past Hamas terrorists were known to request that the Palestinian Authority place them in protective detention. Others are forced to be continually on the move from place to place for their own safety. All of this naturally disturbs the day-to-day operations of a terrorist organization, and with it, the process of preparing and carrying out attacks.
On the cost side of the equation, there are several factors which should be taken into account. The first is the physical costs of the counter-terrorist operation -- the monetary and technological costs -- which are usually negligible. The second and more significant cost is the intelligence damage. Since this kind of operation requires concrete and accurate intelligence, in the wake of the operation, the Palestinian Authority will do everything possible to locate the sources of Israeli intelligence. Thus, the targeting of the terrorists can result in intelligence sources being either withdrawn or blown. Thirdly, there is the matter of the operation's cost in terms of Israel's international image. The majority of Western countries do not view the deliberate targeting of terrorists as a legitimate operation, unless the terrorists involved were acting against their own country. Thus, carrying out such operations inevitably leads to expressions of international condemnation. This is true even though Israel is careful to limit the use of such measures solely to military targets. The terrorists themselves are, of course, held to no such exacting standards, and concentrate on deliberate attacks against civilians.
But the most significant potential cost in carrying out this type of operation is the boomerang effect. Like any other effective offensive activity against a terrorist organization, targeted attacks immediately raise the motivation of that organization to retaliate. What the outcome of this will be all depends on the previous motivation and capability of the organization targeted. If the organization's ability to execute terror attacks is limited only by its operational capability, then, while the killing of the organization's operatives may raise the group's motivation, this cannot be translated into actual retaliatory attacks.
However, when the organization is limited in its terrorist activity by motivation and interests, rather than by operational capability, then one should expect a backlash to occur. With regard to Hamas, which relies heavily on suicide bombings, we can conclude that the organization is not limited by its capability to carry out attacks. Suicide bombings are the most primitive type of attack, demanding little in the way of skills or physical resources. Due to its extensive network of indoctrination, Hamas has no problem finding volunteers for this type of activity. And since the PA has not even begun to dismantle the Hamas military infrastructure, the organization can easily put together a simple explosive device comprising several kilograms of material. Thus, the motivation of Hamas is definitely going to be higher in the wake of Israel's counter-terrorist activity, and this will very likely be translated into retaliatory attacks.
In the end, the determination of the effectiveness of a particular targeted attack depends on the the net sum of all these costs and benefits. Israeli intelligence can be assumed to be in possession of concrete information on what these "ivy league" terrorists were engaged in before they were killed. The security apparatus is thus the only body in a position to effectively analyze whether the operation was worth the possibility of one or more "boomerang" attacks.
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